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This paper is an extremely tentative analysis of the extent to
which default rules should be tailored. In the introduction to my first
article on default rules, Rob Gertner and I promised to provide a the-
ory for optimal tailoring.1 A close reading of that article, however,
reveals that we never succeeded in providing such a theory. Although
this paper will not correct that failure, I do hope to provide some par-
tial equilibrium insights that might be helpful to others who attempt a
fuller analysis.
The paper also tries to relate optimal tailoring to a relatively well-
developed aspect of tort theory. This aspect is often termed the
degree of "precision"z but also is seen under the rubric of "rules vs.
standards." One of the most important treatments of this topic is
Isaac Ehrlich and Richard Posner's An Economic Analysis of Legal
Rulemaldng.3 That article provides, along \vith many other contribu-
tions, a recurring example of the difference between rules and stan-
dards: "If we want to prevent driving at excessive speeds, one
approach is to post specific speed limits and to declare it"unlawful per
* Professor, Stanford Law School. Jason Johnston, Todd Rakoff, John Setear and Eric
Talley provided helpful comments.
1. Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Anal-
ysis ofDefault Rules, 99 YALE LJ. 87 (1989).
2. Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision ofAdministrative Rules, 93 YALE LJ. 65 (1983).
3. Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis ofLegal Rulemaking, 3 J.
LEGAL STUD. 257 (1974).
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se to exceed those limits; another is to eschew specific speed limits and
simply declare that driving at unreasonable speeds is unIawful."4
Colin Diver and Louis Kaplow have also made substantial contribuM
tions to this literature.s The articles in this "rules vs. standards" disM
cussion attempt to identify when lawmakers should promulgate rules
(specific speed limits) or standards (general requirement to drive
safely).
This literature, however, has largely ignored how the choice
between rules and standards is affected by the ability of private parties
to contract around the law.6 The existing theory then is a theory
about the optimal precision of immutable rules rather than a theory
about the optimal precision of default rules.
The rather minimal thesis of this paper is that the ability of priM
vate parties to contract around rules or standards affects their optimal
level of precision? It is not appropriate to simply import the tort,
administrative law and immutable rule theories to the contract context
where parties have the private option to exit. It may be exceedingly
4. Id. at 257.
5. Diver, supra note 2; Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42
DUKE LJ. 557 (1992). Kathleen Sullivan has also just written an excellent analysis of constitu-
tional rules and standards. Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991 Tenn-Foreword:
The Justices ofRules and Standards, 106 HARv. L. REv. 22 (1992); see also MARK KELMAN, A
GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 15·63 (1987); Duncan Kennedy, Fonn and Substance in
Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARv. L. REv. 1685, 1687-1713 (1976); Margaret J. Radin, Recon-
sidering the Rule ofLaw, 69 B.U. L. REv. 781, 783-91 (1989); Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud
in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REv. 577, 592·93 (1988); Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33
UCLA L. REv. 379 (1985).
6. There are notable published exceptions to this claim. Kaplow has a short discussion of
how his theory would relate to default rules. Kaplow, supra note 5, at 618-20; see also Douglas
G. Baird & Robert Weisberg, Rules, Standards, and the Battle ofthe Fonns: A Reassessment of
§ 2-207, 68 VA. L. REv. 1217, 1221 (1982) ("[T]he battle of the forms must be understood in light
of a fundamental question in jurisprudence-whether to use formal "rules" or open·ended
"standards" to resolve the mutual rights of private parties."); Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 3, at
273 ("[W]e observe greater use of strict liability in tort and contract than in criminal contexts
and we observe heavy use of quite arbitrary rules in areas of the law such as commercial and
real-property law where the parties subject to the rules can transact around them at moderate
cost.").
Moreover, there are three important works in progress analyzing rules vs. standards in the
contractual setting: Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, The Political Economy ofPrivate Legisla-
tures: An Analysis of the Making of Commercial Law (Aug. 23,1993) (unpublished manuscript,
on file with the Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal); Gillian K. Hadfield, Judicial
Competence and the Interpretation ofIncomplete Contracts, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 159 (1994); Jason
S. Johnston, Balancing Under Rules vs. Standards (1993) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
the author). The concurrence of this interest suggests the beginnings of trend.
7. Kaplow, supra note 5, at 619 ("Background laws raise different issues, and thereCore
would require that yet another framework be created.").
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hard, however, to provide a general theory. While the works of Ehr-
lich and Posner, Diver and Kaplow contain compelling insights, none
succeeds in providing a truly general or complete analysis-in part
because the topic is so amorphous. The normative choice between
rules and standards becomes even more difficult when parties can
contract around the law. This paper is a preliminary investigation of
the default theory of rules vs. standards.
ll. DEFINING TERMS
Before proceeding, I will try to define some terminology. It is
difficult to be precise in this area (indeed, one might argue that the
definitions are more standard-like than rule-like). Ehrlich and Posner
distinguish between rules and standards in the following way: "A rule
withdraws from the decision maker's consideration one or more of the
circumstances that would be relevant to decision according to a stan-
dard. . .. The difference between a rule and a standard is a matter of
degree-the degree of precision."s Louis Kaplow, however, distin-
guishes between the two terms on different grounds: "[T]he only dis-
tinction between rules and standards is the extent to which efforts to
give content to the law are Undertaken before or after individuals
act."g Kaplow distinguishes between the degree of complexity and
when that complexity becomes known-only the latter determines
whether th~ law is-a rule or a standard.10 Thus, Kaplow envisions four
permutations: Simple Rules, Simple Standards, Complex Rules, and
Complex Standards.ll Kaplow's notion of complexity captures Ehr-
lich and Posner's concern with whether the decision turns on many or
few facts-but Kaplow emphasizes that, independent of its complex-
ity, the content of a rule mayor may not be known until after individ-
uals act.12
Kaplow argues that legal consideration of rules vs. standards
often confuses these independent dimensions-wrongly comparing
complex standards with simple rules. Instead, he suggests that we
8. Ehrlich & Posner. supra note 3, at 258.
9. Kaplow, supra note 5, at 560 (emphasis omitted).
10. fd. at 586-96.
11. fd. at 588-90.
12. Colin Diver sets forth yet another system for capturing the degree of precision which
concerns the "transparency," "accessibility" and "congruence" of particular laws. Diver, supra
note 2, at 67-68.
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would do better to compare rules and standards of equal complexity.13
While Kaplow's distinction between complexity and timing is powerN
ful, in this paper I cleave to Ehrlich and Posner's initial distinction
between rules and standards which focuses on the number of facts
upon which decisions turn (what Kaplow calls complexity).14
\
III. THEORETICAL INCOMPLETENESS OF THE
HYPOTHETICAL CONTRACTING APPROACH
It is useful to try to relate this terminology to standard contract
theory. Bob Scott coined the term "off-the-rack" to describe a conN
tractual gap-filler or default rule that applied to all contracting parties.
Even though "off-the-rack" clothing often comes in different sizes,
these off-the-rack rules tend to be "one-size-fits-all." If the rule
doesn't fit, the contracting parties are obliged to change it by an
explicit provision. Continuing this sartorial imagery, "tailored"
defaults condition legal treatment on particular attributes or conduct
of the contracting parties. Untailored ("offNthe-rack") defaults are
rule-like because they are contingent on fewer variables, while taiN
lored defaults are standard-like because they are contingent on more
variables concerning the attributes or conduct of the particular conN
tracting parties.1S
13. Kaplow introduces the useful concept of the "rule equivalent to the standard": "For
any standard, consider the actual outcomes that would arise for all poSsible cases. Now, define
the 'rule equivalent to the standard' (or the 'de facto' standard) as that rule which attaches these
same outcomes to these cases." Kaplow, supra note 5, at 586. This mapping of standard out-
comes into rule space is analytically similar to the mapping of indirect mechanisms into direct
mechanism space as envisioned by the revelation principle. DAVID KREPS, A CoURSE IN
MICROECONOMICS 700 (1991).
14. John Setear has pointed out to me that Kaplow's strong claim that complexity and
timing are independent may not hold. It is difficult to think of truly simple laws that are not
knowable ex ante. Thus, there may not be a "standard equiValent to the rule" that driving Caster
than 55 is illegal. See Kaplow, supra note 5, at 587 n.7S. A certain amount of complexity might
be necessary for a law to be given content ex post. Accordingly, there may only be three broad
categories (complex standards, complex rules and simple rules) among which policy makers can
choose.
15. This definition of tailored defaults is analogous to Ehrlich and Posner's definition of
standards; both describe laws that are, in some way, contingent upon the particular facts of the
cases in which they are applied. Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 3, at 258-59. Kaplow's distinction
between rules and standards (which turns on when people learn the content of the law) can also
be made with regard to tailored and untailored defaults. See Kaplow, supra note 5. For exam-
ple, tailoring does not necessitate that the content of a tailored law be known ex ante. A tai-
lored law might condition some of its elements on facts that are only known after the contract is
formed (ex post). Thus, a tailored default might specify that remedies for breach of contract be
expectation damages for retail contracts, and reliance damages for wholesale contracts. This
tailored default conditions damages on some facts that are known ex ante (retail vs. wholesale)
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Clearly these kinds of categorical divisions can continue ad
nauseum. I apologize for trying your patience. However, I do it to
harmonize the terminology used by "rules vs. standards" and
"default" theorists. I also do it to demonstrate that the dominant the-
ory about default choice is incomplete. The received wisdom of a vast
law-and-economics literature is that default laws should mimic the
hypothetical provisions that the parties would have bargained for.16
There are, however, at least four different types of tailoring that might
be consistent with the hypothetical approach. Hypothetical theorists
might advocate:
(1) an untailored (majoritarlan) rule that most parties would
have wanted;
(2) the tailored rules that particular parties would have wanted;
(3) an untailored (majoritarlan) standard that most parties would
have wanted; and
(4) the tailored standards that particular parties would have
wanted.
The untailored defaults are sometimes referred to as majoritarian
because they refer to the laws that most contractual parties would
want. For example, non-cumulative voting for corporate directors
might be described as an untailored (majoritarian) rule. But hypo-
thetical contract theorists have yet to explain when untailored
majoritarian rules are superior to a more tailored hypothetical
inquiry. A tailored hypothetical approach would ask whether this par-
ticular corporation would have contracted for straight or cumulative
voting. .
In Lewis v. Benedict Coal Corp.,17 the Supreme Court explicitly
employed such a tailored hypothetical approach in deciding whether
payments to a third-party beneficiary pension fund should be subject
to setoff if the union breaches the underlying labor contract.
Although the Court found that most contracting parties "would have
and some facts which are only known after contracting (market conditions). One could also
think of tailoring on the basis of facts that are not common knowledge ex ante. Jason Johnston
has written an excellent paper investigating the implications of tailoring on the basis of facts that
are only known commonly ex post. Johnston, supra note 6. Johnston analyzes the very natural
case in which the reasonableness of one side's behavior might be conditioned (under a standard)
on private information known by the other side. He shows that standards might be desirable in
the contractual setting because they might mitigate the strategic incentives of the party with
private information to enter a Coasian bargain for compensation.
16. Ayres & Gertner, supra note I, at 89-90.
17. 361 U.S. 459 (1960).
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provided that the promisor might protect himself by such means as
would be available against the promisee under a two-party con-
tract,"18 the Court distinguished what parties to a collective bargain-
ing agreement would have wanted and accordingly established a no-
setoff default when the third-party beneficiary is a pension fund.19
It is also clear that the hypothetical contract approach does not
exclude standards as optimal law. It might be that the majority of
contracting parties would prefer to be governed by a "reasonableness"
standard rather than any tailored or untailored rule. Alternatively,
particular contracting parties might want their actions to be judged by
more tailored standards of efficiency or equity.20
Because hypothetical contracting theory speaks neither to
whether contract law should be tailored or untailored nor to the form
of rules or standards, it provides neither a positive theory of what con-
tract law has evolved to be, nor a complete normative theory of what
contract law should be.
Divining the optimal amount of tailoring becomes all the more
difficult when one admits more general theories of default choice.
Rob Gertner and I have argued that penalty or information-forcing
defaults might at times be an efficient way of discouraging strategic
refusals to share productive information.21 Yet one might implement
penalty defaults through either standards or tailoring (or a combina-
tion thereof). For example, it would be possible to announce a tai-
lored punitive standard that seeks to impose an exquisitely tailored
pain to induce even the most recalcitrant contractors to reveal infor-
mation. This kind of standard would be analogous to punitive damage
measures in tort which are supposedly tailored to the characteristics of
particular defendants to deter certain kinds of tortious behavior.
Thus, tailoring defaults might not entail filling gaps with what the par-
ticular parties want, but rather filling gaps with what the particular
parties don't want in order to make all the more sure that all parties
have an incentive to contract explicitly.
18. Id. at 468.
19. Id. at 469; see also Ayres & Gertner, supra note 1, at 90 n.21.
20. The process of tailoring itself might be governed by either rules or standards. Thus,
some choice of law decisions are governed by rules (lex Iocr) and others are governed by weigh.
ing equitable considerations.
21. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 1.
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IV. KAPLOW'S FREQUENCY ANALYSIS
OF IMMUTABLE RULES
Because current contract scholarship has devoted so little atten-
tion to developing a theory of optimal tailoring of default rules, it is
useful to begin with the existing theories of optimal precision and
complexity of immutable rules. For the purposes of this preliminary
analysis, I will focus on Louis Kaplow's approach, which is the most
recent and comprehensive in the field. Although Kaplow distin-
guishes the degree of precision from the timing of when a law is given
its content, he argues that frequency is the key variable in determining
how both dimensions should be structured.22 Put simply, greater fre-
quency militates toward making laws both precise and known ex ante:
The central factor influencing the desirability of rules and standards
is the frequency with which a law will govern conduct. If conduct
will be frequent, the additional costs of designing rules-which are
borne once-are likely to be exceeded by the savings realized each
time the rule is applied.23
Under Kaplow's analysis, rules are more costly to promulgate
than standards, but rules are easier for courts to interpret. If the regu-
lated activity occurs often, then incurring the certain costs of ex ante
rule making once is outweighed by the savings of ex post interpreta-
tion. The intuition is analogous to "turnpike" theorems of economic
growth models in that it may be dynamically efficient to spend money
in a seemingly inefficient direction if the expenditure can induce more
rapid conyergence to efficient outcomes in the future.24
One of the strengths of Kaplow's analysis is his attention to the
costs of parties becoming informed about the law. Kaplow assumes
that the relative vagueness makes standards more costly than rules for
individuals to learn about. Because of this cost difference, Kaplow
envisions situations where individuals may become informed about
the legal content of a rule, but not about the legal content of a stan-
dard: "[i]f ... the cost of predicting standards is high, individuals will
not choose to become as well informed about how standards would
apply to their behavior."2S
22. Kaplow, supra note 5, at 621.
23. ld.
24. See OUVIER J. BLANCHARD & STANLEY FISCHER, LECTURES ON MACROECONOMICS
101-2 (1989).
25. Kaplow, supra note 5, at 564. He analyzes an explicit model which leads to three differ-
ent types of equilibria:
1) parties fail to become informed under either a rule or standard;
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Kapiow's assumption about the cost of interpreting standards and
rules is plausible and allows him to focus on the important issue of
whether parties have incentives to learn about the law-but there are
several other ways that parties may react to the vagueness of stan-
dards that might alter the optimal choice of legal rules. FIrst, while
Kaplow is right that rules are probably cheaper to interpret if one is
striving for a precise knowledge of legal contours, it may be that stan-
dards give individuals a less expensive way of gaining a rough idea of
the law's content. Thus, although the reasonable price default or the
lost profit damage default may be more expensive to interpret pre-
cisely than a more explicit ex ante rule, it might give market partici-
pants a rough approximation of damages fairly cheaply.26 Anyone
who has tried to work through the social security disability grids27 will
understand that ex ante precision may increase the costs of making
rough estimates. This point is related to the scholarship of Randy
Barnett, suggesting that standards may be more transparent than
more precise defaults.28 But this will only be true to the extent that
the standards are expressed in terms that have "commonsense expec-
tations" for the "relevant community of discourse."29 Under this anal-
ysis, the process of tailoring would be an inquiry into defining the
"relevant communities."30
The possibility that standards might give less expensive rough
guides to action also implicates a second way that parties can respond
to legal ambiguity. If a standard gives a rough indication of legal con-
sequences, it may be cheaper for parties to change their conduct to fall
2) parties become informed under either a rule or a standard; or
3) parties become informed under a rule, but not under a standard.
ld. at 571-77. This notion is closely related to Randy Barnett's description of individuals' deci-
sions to remain "rationally ignorant" of a background rule. The essence of this argument is that
non-frequent players, because they are unable to amortize the fixed costs of becoming informed
over the course of their dealings, will rationally choose to remain ignorant. Randy E. Barnett,
The Sound ofSilence: Default Rulesand Contractual Consent, 78 VA. L. REv. 821, 887-92 (1992).
26. In more quantitative terms, it might be cheaper to estimate damages to within a $1000
standard deviation using a standard, while it would be cheaper under a rule to calculate damages
to within a $100 standard deviation.
27. 20 C.F.R. pt 404, subpt. P, app. 2 (1991).
28. Barnett, supra note 25.
29. Barnett writes:
Ifa goal of a consent theoI)' is to have the law of contract honor the SUbjective consent
of the parties to the extent possible in a world of limited access to personal knowledge
of intentions, default rules reflecting the commonsense expectation within the relevant
community of discourse will lead to fewer interpretive mistakes than some other type
of rule.
ld. at 882.
30. Barnett acknowledges the difficulty of defining the relevant communities. ld. at 906·07.
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within a safe harbor.31 A recent article by Gillian Hadfield explores
the ways that parties may respond to the greater ambiguity of stan-
dard-like laws by changing their level of performance-to make sure
that they don't run afoul of their performance obligations.32 If the
costs of rough interpretation and small changes in behavior are
cheaper under standards than the cost of interpretation under rules,
then it is no longer clear that rules are superior for more frequent
behavior. Even though rules economize on the sum of promulgation
and enforcement costs when the conduct to be governed is frequent,
inclusion of the costs of interpretation in the efficiency calculus may
lead to the opposite conclusion.
This is particularly true ifone considers the frequency per actor in
the analysis. Even if the conduct to be regulated is relatively frequent
in the aggregate, its frequency per actor may be low. For example,
while many people may buy wedding rings, few are frequent purchas-
ers. Thus, the costs of learning complex rules may be especially oner-
ous as opposed to' the costs of roughly interpreting a complex
standard. Relatively transparent standards may economize on the
costs of interpretation-particularly when the frequency per inter-
preter is low.
v. THE OPTION OF CONTRACTUAL EXIT: DEFAULT
STANDARDS VS. DEFAULT RULES
Analysts of rules vs. standards emphasize that individuals can
react to legal imprecision by investing in information or changing their
behavior to make sure that they comply with legal requirements.
These are two natural reactions to legal imprecision in immutable
rules.33
But individuals have an additional option when the legal rule or
standard is merely a default or gap-filler: they can contract not only
for different substantive provisions, but also for a different degree of
precision.34 Indeed, although default analysis is often couched in
terms of substituting one rule for another, parties could contract
31. For a fuller discussion of safe harbors see Peter P. Swire, Safe Harbors and a Proposal
to Improve the Community Reinvestment Act, 79 VA. L. REv. 349 (1993).
32. Hadfield, :supra note 6.
33. Barnett has independently discussed the superiority of default rules over immutable
rules with respect to similar issues ofover- and under-inclusion caused by immutable rules. Bar-
nett, :supra note 25, at 867-69.
34. Goetz and Scott have stressed at times that the parties can also respond by choosing
not to contract-a particularly extreme way of avoiding the costs of legal imprecision. Charles J.
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around a default standard for a more precise rule (or contract around
a precise default rule for a less precise standard). We see both types
of movements along the precision spectrum in actual practice. Parties
sometimes will draft "reasonableness" clauses and at other times spec-
ify more specific rule-like clauses (such as for liquidated damages).
Kaplow has recognized the importance of this option of contrac-
tual exit: "Sometimes •.• it might be cheapest simply to include such
provisions in the contract without incurring the cost to determine
whether they are necessary. Thus, many contracts contain extensive
boilerplate providing for the result an adjudicator would likely reach
in anyevent."3S
Contracting parties may avoid the costs of becoming informed
about a default standard or nile by instead bearing the costs of explic-
itly contracting around the rule.
An efficiency analysis of rules vs. standards will often turn on
whether contractual parties decide to explicitly contract instead of
bearing the costs of becoming informed. For this reason, Kaplow
argues that the costs of becoming informed will often drop out of the
standard vs. rule analysis: "[T]he calculus determining whether
[default] rules or [default] standards are preferable would emphasize
ex ante promulgation costs and ex post enforcement costs, giving less
attention'to costs of advice by contracting parties because they often
would not choose to acquire advice about such matters.,,36 Kaplow's
frequency analysis, however, plays out much differently when the par-
ties have the option of contracting around the rule or the standard. It
may no longer be efficient to expend the high promulgation costs of a
rule if private parties nonetheless intend to contract for an express
private provision. The higher costs of promulgating a rule are only
likely to be efficient if the rule deters private parties from contracting
to substitute their own proVisions.
Goetz & Robert E. Scott. The Limits of Expanded Choice: An Analysis of the Interactions
Between Express and Implied Contract Tenns, 73 CAL. L. REv. 261 (1985).
35. Kaplow, supra note 5, at 620 n.183. Kaplow also implicitly recognizes that standards
may be less expensive rough guides for actions: "When parties contemplate entering into a con-
tractual relationship, they have only a limited need to know how a court would fill gaps in their
agreement, as long as the court (or another designated decisionmaker) could be anticipated to
act as they would wish." Id. at 619. Boilerplate also eIiminates the risk that courts will change a
default and retroactively enforce the new default in pre-existing contracts. See John H. Ken-
nedy, Ex Went to Jail OverPrinciple ofSplitting the Principal, BOSTON GLOBE, Jun. 10, 1993, at 1
(new Massachusetts default calling for equitable distribution of inherited assets applied to mar-
riage that predated this default change).
36. Kaplow, supra note 5, at 619·20.
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Alan Schwartz and Bob Scott have recently argued that many
D.C.C. provisions are inefficient for the very reason that parties often
contract around them.37 Schwartz and Scott focus on the incentives of
the parties to contract around default standards, but either default
rules or default standards may induce explicit contracting.38
Indeed, any of Kaplow's four permutations of complexity/simplic-
ity and ex ante/ex post content may induce the majority of contracting
parties to contract for alternative treatment. Simple (untailored)
default rules can act as penalty defaults because of the well-known
properties of over- and underlnclusiveness. Complex default rules
might induce more complete contracting because it is comparatively
less costly to write comprehensive provisions than it is to become
informed of the complex rule. And, either simple or complex stan-
dards could induce more complete contracting if the parties expect
that judicial application of the standard will be expensive and/or
inaccurate.39
There are certain provisions such as price and quantity where pri-
vate contracts are likely to contract around any default regardless of
either its complexity or the precision of its ex ante or ex post imple-
mentation. Price and quantity defaults represent a striking counterex-
ample to Kaplow's frequency hypothesis. Regardless of the extremely
high frequency of transactions, it would be inefficient for lawmakers
to expend resources promulgating more complex and tailored rules,
because the expenses in creating this default would be wasted as pri-
vate parties could be expected to almost universally contract around.
Instead, where parties are likely to explicitly contract, contract
law has responded in two ways that entail very low promulgation
costs. The default price term is a "reasonableness" standard,40 while
the default quantity term is non-enforcement or a zero-quantity rule.41
While the zero-quantity default is more explicitly a penalty (because
no parties would contract to sell zero), the reasonableness standard
37. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 6.
38. See id.
39. It is interesting that contract decisions almost never analyze what the parties might
have reasonably thought the default rules were at the time of contracting. Because of this fail-
ure, parties have an incentive to explicitly contract if they are worried that the default will
change in the interim between contracting and performance. It may be better to put in boiler-
plate language that restates even existing defaults instead of risking that courts will apply
changed defaults to preexisting gaps.
40. See U.c.c. § 2-305 (1990).
41. See id. § 2-201.
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acts as a penalty default because almost all parties prefer to incur the
costs of explicit contracting rather than leave the matter to ex post
court determination.42
When contracting parties are going to contract around the
defaults, rule-like defaults are least likely to be efficient. The exam-
ples of price and quantity terms can help us see that such explicit con-
tracting is most likely to occur when:
(1) the parties have heterogeneous preferences about what the
term should be; and
(2) the term relates to a high probability contingency. Price and
quantity terms fulfill both of these conditions.
The U.C.C. default rule that the sales price is due at the time of
delivery43 is probably better than a "reasonablenesslt default because
a majority of contracting parties may homogeneously prefer such a
term. But there is no clear plurality of contracts that have any partic-
ular quantity-because there is an extreme heterogeneity of prefer-
ences. This heterogeneity makes any particular quantity default rule
act like a penalty default for the vast majority of contracting parties.44
Parties are also much more likely, ceteris paribus, to contract over
contingencies that have a higher probability of occurrence. Thus, we
. see more explicit and detailed provisions about terms of performance
for the normal course of events than we do for low probability contin-
gencies. Since parties are likely to contract about high probability
contingencies anyway, it makes less sense to expend resources on a
particularized rule.
Even when most people are likely to explicitly contract, different
defaults may produce different gains from trade for those who fail, for
one reason or another, to contract around the default. The appropri-
ate default choice should grow out of one's theories for why there are
contractual gaps. One of the great difficulties of thinking about the
appropriate gap filler for price and quantity is that it is hard to model
why parties would leave these terms out of their express agreements.
42. Rob Gertner and I have suggested that the difference between these rules might be
efficient since the costs of ex post determination of the hypothetical price is likely to be much
cheaper than the ex post determination of the hypothetical quantity. See Ayres & Gertner,
supra note 1, at 95-97.
43. U.C.C. § 2.310(a) (1990).
44. Ehrlich and Posner also argue that the more homogeneous the conduct, the lower the
costs of detailedness. Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 3, at 277-80.
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As a general matter, policy makers should explicitly compare the
contractual equilibria resulting from various defaults45 and choose the
type of tailoring that produces the best equilibrium. Efficiency-
minded lawmakers, for example, would choose the type of tailoring
that minimizes a host of costs associated with contracting: these
include the costs of contracting around the defaults (successfully or
unsuccessfully) as well as promulgation, application and information
costS.46
Kaplow cogently argues that many authors conflate issues of
complexity together with the timing issue of when the law is given its
content.47 But simple rules will often dominate both complex rules
and simple standards, so that policy makers' operative default choices
may often devolve to a choice between simple rules and complex stan-
dards. Simple rule defaults are likely to dominate simple standard
defaults because they are more accessible for the parties and the
courts to see and therefore likely to economize on the costs of explicit










Simple rule defaults are also likely to dominate complex rule
defaults. When contracting parties have homogeneous preferences,
complex, tailored rules will be unnecessary. And when contracting
parties have heterogeneous preferences, it will be extremely costly for
courts to provide tailored defaults that succeed at minimizing transac-
tion costs. As I have said with regard to corporate contracting:
"[L]egislatures are effectively limited to choosing among the class of
untailored and unconditional entitlements and obligations. To put the
45. Ian Ayres, Making a Difference: The Contractual Contributions ofEasterbrook and FIS-
chel, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 1391, 1401 (1992) (book review).
46. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 1. As stressed above, this hypothetical approach is
unlikely to elucidate how precisely tailored default rules should be.
47. Kaplow, supra note 5, at 586-96.
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point most simply, any contractual provision that a legislature could
write ex ante, corporations could write better."48 In the non-corpo-
rate context, the only "rule-like" defaults that are likely to reduce
transaction costs are simple, transparent rules that may allow parties
to avoid the costs of contracting over homogeneously preferred
provisions.
It should be stressed that in a world without transaction costs,
parties may want more fully contingent contractual provisions, but the
same costs that prevent private parties from writing fully state-contin-
gent contracts may all the more prevent lawmakers from providing
these default provisions. Viewed in this sense, it is unlikely that legis-
lative provision of defaults will make contracts less "incomplete" as
the term is used by economists.49
It is possible, however, that complex standards may be more effi-
cient defaults than simple rules. In a recent review of Easterbrook
and Fischel,so I argued that complex standards might make presump-
tively better defaults for publicly traded corporations, because it
would be trivially easy for parties to contract around reasonableness
standards for more rule-like provisions in their articles of incorpora-
tion (but parties might have much harder time contracting around
rules for muddy treatment).
The greater cost in affirmatively specifying complex contractual
provisions also makes it more difficult to draw inferences from private
contractual behavior. If contracting parties fail to contract around a
complex standard default in favor of a simple rule, then one might
infer that the complex standard is the superior default. Failure to con-
tract out of a complex standard implies that there is no simple (and
therefore cheap to specify) provision that would do better.
In contrast, the failure to contract around a simple rule default
for a complex standard does not indicate that the simple rule default is
superior: "Because of the substantial difficulties that [contracting par-
ties] will have in affirmatively contracting for fully contingent obliga-
tions or entitlements, the failure of firms to try should not persuade
48. Ayres, supra note 45, at 1414.
49. Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Strategic Ccntractual Inefficiency and the Optimal Choice
ofLegal Rules, 101 YALE LJ. 729 (1992); Hadfield, supra note 6.
50. Ayres, supra note 45.
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policy makers that [contracting parties] do not want muddy default
rules.,,51
A£. promised, this section does not provide anything like a general
theory as to when contractual defaults should be rules or standards.
But hopefully it shows that frequency need not lead toward the adop-
tion of rules. Simple rule defaults are likely to be efficient when con-
tracting parties have homogeneous preferences for a particular rule
and when the rule addresses high probability events. Unless
lawmakers intentionally want to induce contracting (as with informa-
tion-forcing strategies), evidence that parties generally contract
around the simple rule suggests that a standard-like default might be
more efficient.
VI. CONSIDERING THE CONDmONS FOR
CONTRACTING AROUND
The foregoing analysis has addressed whether the underlying
default should be rule- or standard-like. A similar inquiry could also
be applied in trying to determine. the necessary and sufficient condi-
tions for contracting around a default.52
This latter inquiry investigates whether or not the parties have in
fact successfully contracted around the default:
[B]efore implementing any default standard, courts need to estab-
lish, as a logically prior matter, rules for deciding when a contract is
incomplete. • . . This question of when a contract is incomplete is
identical to the question of what is sufficient to contract around a
default. A court's holding that the parties' attempt to contract
around a given default is insufficient is identical to a holding that
there is still a gap in the contract.53
The necessary and sufficient conditions for contracting around a
default can themselves be either rule-like or standard-like. At the
51. Ayres, supra note 45, at 1407. The same holds true for failure to contract out of a
complex standard. There may be other complex provisions that dominate the complex default,
but are prohibitively costly. It!.
This notion is consistent with Randy Barnett's implicit consent theory of incomplete con-
tract. Although he argues that the omission of contractual language can often be interpreted as
tacit consent by the parties to be governed by the default rules, he notes that this interpretation
is only valid "[s]o long as the costs of learning the content of default rules and of contracting
around them are sufficiently low ••••" Barnett, supra note 25, at 897.
52. Barnett has analogously examined the necessary and sufficient conditions for enforcing
defaults. Barnett, supra note 25, at 828, 866, 897-98.
53. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 1, at 119-20.
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rule-like extreme, contract laws could give parties a "menu" of provi-
sions to choose from and "magic words" that would constitute suffi-
cient conditions for opting for a particular contractual treatment.54
Rule-like necessary or sufficient conditions for contracting around
defaults are extremely rare in either the common law of contract or
the DCC. The conditions for contracting around a default are often
governed by common law standards-which may over time develop
into more rule-like laws. But the process can be extremely slow
because courts seldom explicitly state necessary conditions and only
decide sufficiency cases on a piecemeal basis.55
Litigants often argue about whether given contractual provisions
are sufficient to contract around a particular default. When the courts
find that a contract's particular words are insufficient to contract
around the default, the courts usually refuse to articulate what con-
tractuallanguage would be sufficient. For instance, in Peevyhouse v.
Garland Coal & Mining Co. ,56 the court found that the parties'
explicit attempt to contract around the diminution in value default
was faulty. But the court failed to announce what kind of provision
would be sufficient to allow cost of performance:
Even though the decision (rightly or wrongly) resolved uncertainty
about what the default damages would be, it did little to resolve the
uncertainty about how one could contract around this default. Even
prospective parties who had read Peevyhouse and had known that it
"does not interfere with the property owner's right to 'do what he
will with his own'" would still face considerable uncertainty about
how to exercise that right.57
The failure of both common and statutory contract law to provide
rule-like sufficient conditions for contracting is inconsistent with con-
tractual efficiency. While complex standards may make the most effi-
cient substantive defaults, the sufficient conditions for contracting
around these defaults should at least include rule-like "safe harbors"58
and currently they do not.
54. Thus, for example, the Revised Model Business Corporation Act states: "A statement
included in the articles of incorporation that 'the corporation elects to have preemptive rights'
(or words of similar import) means that the following [six] principles apply except to the extent
the articles of incorporation expressly provide otherwise." MODEL BusINESS CoRP. Ac:r
§ 6.30(b) (1984).
55. Individual contract litigants seldom have reason to ask courts to find that particular
words are necessaty to contract around a default, because the parties could always just prospec-
tively choose to use the words that they think are sufficient.
56. 382 P.2d 109 (Okla. 1962), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 906 (1963).
57. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 1, at 123 (footnote omitted).
58. See Swire, supra note 31.
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The failure of common law courts to establish clear rules for con-
tracting around defaults may be related to an important form of judi-
cial nullification. As already noted, one of the costs of standards is the
greater expense of ex post implementation-which includes the
(expected) costs of court error in :filling the gap. In the contractual
context, however, there is another type of cost stemming from judicial
error in deciding whether the parties have sufficiently contracted
around the default.
Many scholars have noted the disturbing tendency of courts to
turn default laws into immutable laws.59 The Peevyhouse case itself
might alternatively be interpreted as a disingenuous attempt to estab-
lish diminution in value as an immutable rule.60 Common law courts'
hostility toward liquidated damages provisions may also exemplify
this tendency. A first-best solution to overcome this tendency might
be through statutory rules announcing sufficient procedures for con-
tracting around defaults.
If, however, the tendency to transform default laws to immutable
ones is unavoidable, it might inform our choice of the underlying
default. As a very preliminary matter, it might be that courts are
more likely to make default standards immutable than to make
default rules immutable. Courts, for example, have long resisted con-
tractual modification of the expectation damages standard.61 It may
be that courts defend their powers to apply standards by applying
greater hurdles to contracting parties who want to avoid them-
whereas efforts to contract around simple rule defaults (especially if
promulgated by legislatures) may give courts less concem.62 More-
over, the over- and underbreadth of rule-like defaults often more
clearly signal that the lawmaker intended to give private parties the
option of contractual mutation. If this tendency exists, one advantage
of simple rule defaults is that they may be more default-like than are
complex standards.
59. See, e.g., Goetz & Scott, supra note 34.
60. The dissent in Peevyhouse suggested as much. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 1, at 122-
61. See Eric L. Talley, Contract Renegotiation, Economics, and the Liquidated Damages
Rules, 46 STAN. L. REv. (forthcoming May 1994).
62. A countervailing effect against jUdicial egoism (which drives judges to turn default laws
into immutable laws) is the desire to lead the quiet life by reducing the courts' case load-which
might give judges an incentive to eschew standards to maximize the chance of settlement.
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VII. CONCLUSION
The choice between rules or standards is extremely complex and
becomes all the more complex when one introduces the possibility
that parties can contractually alter the law. In many circumstances the
dichotomous choice between rules or standards may be a false one,
because lawmakers may prefer to enact a complementary set of rules
and standards. Thus, in most jurisdictions, highway speed is regulated
by supplementing a rule with a standard. As Ehrlich and Posner
observed: "It can be made unlawful to drive more than 60 miles per
hour or to drive at any lower speed that is unreasonably fast in the
particular circumstances."63 In areas of contract performance, con-
tract law might specify per se rules of performance and non-perform-
ance, but specify a "reasonableness" standard to govern conduct
faIling outside the rule-governed conduct.
This method of combining rules and standards is clearly the sensi-
ble way of governing the conditions for contracting around rules.
Rules should establish clear "magic words" that are sufficient to con-
tract for particular kinds of treatment; however, the common law
should back up these rules with a general standard of following the
commonly understood meaning of the parties' explicit language-
even when that language fails to employ the "magic words" for con-
tracting around particular defaults.64
At various points, this talk has averred to optimal complexity and
tailoring. These terms are exceedingly difficult to define. The more
that I think about them, the more pessimistic I am that they are sus-
ceptible to a satisfying general analysis.
63. Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 3, at 268.
64. Thus even ifa corporation's articles of incorporation did not use the term "preemptive
rights," it should grant them if the contract verbally describes the shareholder rights that we
normally attribute to those words. See supra note 55.
